Abstract-The boomerang analysis, together with its offspring the amplified boomerang analysis and the rectangle analysis, are techniques that are widely used in the analysis of block ciphers. Realistic examples are given which demonstrate that the boomerang analysis can commonly give probability values that are highly inaccurate. Thus, any complexity estimates for the security of a block cipher based on the boomerang or rectangle analysis must be viewed extremely sceptically.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE boomerang analysis of [1] is an adaptation of differential cryptanalysis [2] , [3] in which quartets of encryptions and decryptions are used. Two related plaintexts are encrypted and the resulting pair of ciphertexts is then used to generate two new related ciphertexts. These two new ciphertexts are then decrypted to give two new plaintexts. The aim of the boomerang analysis is to use such quartets of plaintexts and of ciphertexts to find key information. Furthermore, enhanced versions of the boomerang analysis based on this idea have also been developed, such as the amplified boomerang analysis [4] and the rectangle analysis [5] .
There is, however, no a priori reason for the probabilistic argument of [1] concerning the boomerang analysis and therefore for the related analyses, to be correct. We demonstrate this by giving simple examples using the Data Encryption Standard [6] and the Advanced Encryption Standard [7] . The motivation for the use of the word boomerang to describe such an analysis of quartets is given in [1] .
This is why we call it the boomerang attack: when you send it properly, it always comes back to you.
We send a or an boomerang, but our boomerang won't come back.
II. THE BOOMERANG ANALYSIS
We describe the basic boomerang analysis in the manner of [1] and a schematic diagram of the boomerang analysis, based on Fig. 1 of [1] , is given in Fig. 1 . We base our notation on that of [1] , so we suppose that represents the block cipher encryption under a fixed key. The basic boomerang analysis is based on a quartet of encryptions and decryptions and the process for generating such a quartet is described below.
• Choose values and .
• Choose a pair of plaintexts and such that .
• Encrypt and to obtain ciphertexts and .
• Obtain two further ciphertexts and .
• Decrypt and to obtain plaintexts and . The boomerang analysis is an attempt to use the ideas of differential cryptanalysis [2] , [3] It is the case that is indeed a condition required to start the characteristic for , the inverse of the initial part of the encryption operation. However, whilst this condition is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition, as the examples of Sections III and VI demonstrate.
The statistical reasoning of the boomerang analysis given in [1, Section IV] states that the probability of a right quartet satisfies where is the probability of the differential characteristic under and is the probability of the differential characteristic under . The complexity estimates for the boomerang analysis given in [1] are based on this estimate of . However, in both Sections Section III and VI, we give examples of a boomerang analysis with , , but for which a right quartet can never occur, that is .
III. A BOOMERANG
We consider a boomerang analysis on a block cipher that consists of four rounds of the Data Encryption Standard [6] . Thus, is the encryption under some fixed key of four rounds of the (without and ) and we suppose that is the initial two rounds of this encryption and that the final two rounds of this encryption. We use the two differential characteristics used in the iterated differential cryptanalysis of the [2] , [3] . Thus, we define
so in particular, we have
The reasoning of [1, Section IV] would now assert that the probability of a right quartet is at least . We now consider the conditions required for a right quartet to occur. Accordingly, we let , , , denote the four 6-bit inputs to S-Box 2 in the fourth round of this cipher. Thus , , , are a selection of six bits of , , , . For a right quartet, we require that and B . Allowing for the expansion phase of the round function [6] , a right quartet therefore satisfies which gives the following relationship between the four 6-bit S-Box inputs:
In the classical differential cryptanalysis of the , we require that the outputs of the respective pairs of S-Boxes are identical. Thus we have where is the 6-bit to 4-bit function given by S-Box 2. For a right quartet to exist, we therefore require that there exists a 6-bit value such that
It is easy to verify by a direct search of all possibilities for that no such value for exists. It is is not therefore possible for a right quartet to exist in this boomerang analysis. In other words, a right quartet exists in this boomerang analysis with probability zero, rather than than the probability of at least asserted by [1] . This boomerang never comes back.
IV. THE AMPLIFIED BOOMERANG ANALYSIS
The amplified boomerang analysis of [4] , the other part of the boomerang condition, uniformly at random. The example of Section III shows this is not the case. There is no a priori reason to assume that amplified boomerang analysis works in the manner described by [4] .
V. THE RECTANGLE ANALYSIS
The basic idea of the rectangle analysis is mentioned in [1] , but was developed by [5] as an adaptation of the amplified boomerang analysis that considers all values for the appropriate intermediate values. We suppose that we are considering an -bit block cipher and we let denote the quartet vectors at the plaintext, intermediate and ciphertext stages respectively, so , , and are vectors over GF(2) of length . We now let denote the matrices over GF(2) giving the required differences at these stages, where the defining sub-blocks are matrices. Thus and are matrices of rank and is a matrix of rank . We let denote the required differences at these stages, so the probability of interest for the analysis of plaintext and ciphertext quartets is then given by Under the assumption that the sequence of difference values forms a Markov process [8] , this probability is given by
The first term of the above summand would be evaluated by the method of the analysis of [5] as . We now consider the example of Section III and take and B . We show in Section III that The analysis of [5] would therefore give B B as the dominant term when evaluating the above summation for , whereas in fact this term is zero in this summation. As with other analyses based on the boomerang idea, there is no a priori reason to assume the rectangle analysis works in the manner described by [5] .
VI. AN BOOMERANG
We now give another similar cautionary example about the boomerang analysis, basing this example on the Advanced Encryption Standard [7] , [9] . We consider a block cipher based on two (complete) rounds of the . Thus is the encryption under some fixed key of two rounds of the and we suppose that is the initial round of this encryption and that the final round of this encryption. The only nonlinear part of an round is the phase, which consists of the application of an S-Box to each byte of the 16-byte state, where an S-Box is formally a function . The nonlinear part of an S-Box is an "inversion" operation on bytes, given by in and there exist many nonzero input byte differences and output byte differences such that the differential probability for the S-Box is [9] , [10] . One such pair of input and output differences for is given by and , so we have Allowing for the effect of the and operations, we can base a boomerang analysis on the differences This gives the following differential probabilities for the two parts of the block cipher:
We now consider the effect of the right quartet restrictions on the possibilities for the intermediate values. A similar analysis to Section III shows that If we let denote the first byte of , then for a right quartet we require that A search through all possible byte values for quickly shows that there is no byte value which satisfies the two above equations.
We have therefore shown that it is not possible for a right quartet to exist in this boomerang analysis, even though the reasoning of Section IV of [1] would give a lower bound for the probability of a right quartet of at least . Just like the boomerang of Section III, this boomerang never comes back.
VII. A HIGH PROBABILITY BOOMERANG
We have given a boomerang and an boomerang (Sections III and VI) which cannot occur, that is they happen with probability zero. In both cases, this was demonstrated by giving a pair of S-Box equations which had no solution. Of course, if we had set up a different potential boomerang, that is other difference values, we would have obtained other pairs of S-Box equations, which may well have had many solutions. In such a case, it is entirely possible that the boomerang probability may greatly exceed that given by [1] .
We illustrate this point about boomerang probabilities with a striking contrast to the zero-probability nonreturning boomerang of Section III. We simply make a minor modification of the boomerang differences for Section III. Thus, we take rather than B and as for Section III. As for this Section III example, the statistical reasoning of Section IV of [1] now asserts that the probability of a right quartet is . The condition for a right quartet in this case is simply then given by This right quartet is therefore simply the repeated use of a right pair [2] , [3] in differential cryptanalysis. Thus in this case a right quartet occurs with the same probability as a right pair based on this characteristic, namely . The true probability of this boomerang occurring is very much greater than the probability value for this boomerang occurring given by the statistical reasoning of [1] .
VIII. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY AND THE BOOMERANG ANALYSIS
A boomerang analysis requires the use of conditional probability. The condition for a right quartet is a Rank-condition, as is illustrated by the matrix (Section V) of rank and we denote this event by
. However, the boomerang-type analysis of [1] , [4] , [5] instead uses an algebraically less onerous Rank-condition, as illustrated by the matrix (Section V) of rank and we denote this event by . The justification for the application of a boomerang or a related analysis in the manner of [1] essentially asserts for any cryptographic event under consideration that There is simply no probabilistic justification for this assertion.
The application of conditional probability to a boomerangtype analysis is illustrated by the Venn diagram of Fig. 2 . The boomerang-type analysis of [1] , [4] , and [5] uses whereas the correct condition for a boomerang-type analysis is There is no probabilistic reason why these two quantities are related in any way. We can illustrate this by using a fair dice roll with six outcomes {1,2,3,4,5,6} as an example. If the dice throw is at most 2, then the conditional probabilities that the dice roll is odd and that the dice roll is even are given by If we replace the condition that the dice throw is at most 2 with the less onerous condition that the dice throw is at most 3, we obtain the following different conditional probabilities that the dice roll is odd and the dice roll is even:
This simple example shows the central importance of the conditioning event. Arbitrarily replacing one conditioning event by another conditioning event is a fundamental error in the application of conditional probability.
In the and boomerang examples which occur with zero probability (Sections III and VI), we have even though , so
By contrast, in the boomerang example of Section VII, the cryptographic event is actually a subset of , so we have For a boomerang-type analysis to be correct, we require that Loosely speaking, we require that the event occurs with the same frequency in the Rank-subset as it does in the Rank-subset. As stated above, there is no probabilistic reason for this to be the case and as the examples of this paper demonstrate, there is no general cryptographic reason for this to be the case. A cryptographic boomerang-type analysis that merely swaps the Rank-condition for the Rank-condition cannot be regarded as having been substantiated.
IX. COMMENTS ON A RECTANGLE ANALYSIS OF THE
An analysis of the [7] in a specific related key model is given in [11] and this analysis makes use of a number of different techniques based on the cryptographic boomerang. The correctness of the boomerang probabilities given by [1] is asserted by [11] and such values for boomerang probabilities are the foundations of the analysis of the given by [11] . As we have shown, such foundations are not necessarily sound.
We discuss the dubious nature of the analysis given by [11] by considering a critical technique used in this analysis termed the Feistel switch. A value for the probability that a Feistel switch occurs is given in [11] based on the usual boomerang reasoning of [1] , that is based on a Rank-condition rather than the correct Rank-condition. Thus the value given by [11] for the probability that a Feistel switch occurs is not generally correct. This is illustrated by the boomerang example of Section III, which is actually a Feistel switch, with , and B in the notation of [11] . Thus it would be asserted by [11] that this DES example of a Feistel switch, which can never happen, occurs with nonzero probability.
Another technique used by [11] is termed the S-box switch, which essentially considers the cryptographic boomerang when . However, whilst the Rankcondition is used by [11] to give a probability value for the Feistel switch, the Rank-condition is used by [11] to give a probability value for the S-box switch. This is problematic as the boomerang example of Section VII is essentially both an S-box switch and a Feistel switch, with and in the notation of [11] .
These examples show that the justifications for the probability values for various cryptographic boomerang-type events given by [11] are not really convincing. The data requirements for the related key analysis of the given by [11] cannot therefore be regarded as having been soundly demonstrated.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We have given counterexamples that clearly demonstrate that the justification for the boomerang analysis given by [1] is highly questionable. These counterexamples are based on the two most important block ciphers, the and the , so they are not just artificially contrived. Such counterexamples can also be adapted to show that the justifications for derived analyses, such as the amplified boomerang analysis [4] and the rectangle analysis [5] , are also highly questionable. Furthermore, the claims given made by [11] for a related key analysis of the must be regarded as unsubstantiated.
The correct condition for a right quartet in a boomerang-type analysis is a Rank-condition. The boomerang-type analysis replaces the correct right quartet Rank-condition with an algebraically less onerous Rank-condition. Whilst it is possible that, for a particular block cipher and a particular collection of differences, a probability conditional on the Rank-event and a probability conditional on the Rank-event are equal, there is no a priori probabilistic or cryptographic reason for these two conditional probabilities to be equal. The justification for the application of a boomerang or a related analysis in the manner of [1] to a particular block cipher and a particular collection of differences does clearly require the demonstration that the Rank-and Rank-conditions give the same probability.
We have shown that the usual probabilistic argument used to justify the so-called boomerang effect is unsound. A probability value for a boomerang-type analysis derived in the manner of [1] , [4] , [5] can be highly inaccurate and is at best an arbitrary guess for the true probability. In terms of the original motivation for the use of the word boomerang to describe this style of cryptographic analysis, the contribution of this paper can best be summarised as follows:
A cryptographic boomerang need not return from whence it came.
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